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Abstract: Few of Kant’s distinctions have generated as much puzzlement 
and criticism as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between judgments of 
experience, which he describes as objectively and universally valid, and 
judgments of perception, which he says are merely subjectively valid. Yet the 
distinction between objective and subjective validity is central to Kant’s 
account of experience and plays a key role in his Transcendental Deduction 
of the categories. In this paper, I reject a standard interpretation of the 
distinction, according to which judgments of perception are merely 
subjectively valid because they are made without sufficient investigation. In 
its place, I argue that for Kant, judgments of perception are merely 
subjectively valid because they merely report sequences of perceptions had 
by a subject without judging that what is represented by the perceptions is 
connected in the objects the perceptions are of. Whereas the interpretation I 
criticize undercuts Kant’s strategy in the Deduction, I argue, my 
interpretation illuminates it. 
 
Few of Kant’s distinctions have generated as much puzzlement and criticism1 
as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between what he calls judgments of 
experience (henceforth, JOEs)—which he identifies as “objectively and 
universally valid”—and judgments of perception (henceforth, JOPs)—which he 
says are “merely subjectively valid” (Pr., 4:299)  
According to a prominent interpretive narrative,2 the notion of a JOP is 
short-lived: although it figures centrally in the 1783 Prolegomena, Kant soon 
 
1 Norman Kemp Smith, for example, declares that “the illegitimacy and the 
thoroughly misleading character of this distinction hardly require to be pointed out.” 
(Kemp Smith 1918, 288) Paul Guyer insists that the notion of a judgment of perception 
“cannot be reconciled” with Kant’s argument in the B-deduction of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, and argues that its seeming appearance in that section betrays Kant’s 
“continuing confusion” about his own argumentative strategy (Guyer 1987, 101). 
Kotzin and Baumgärtner argue that Kant’s remarks about JOPs are “un-Critical” and 
“fail to conform to some central teachings of the Critique of Pure Reason.” (Kotzin and 
Baumgärtner 1990, 402) 
2 See Kemp Smith 1918, 289; Beck 1978, 50; Guyer 1987, 101-2; Kotzin and 
Baumgärtner 1990, 407; Pollok 2008, 335-6; Sassen 2008, 271-2, 281. 
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comes to see that the possibility of merely subjectively valid judgments is 
incompatible with his other commitments, and thus omits any mention of 
them in the 1787 B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. However, a number 
of factors tell against this narrative. First, the difference between objective and 
merely subjective validity—which forms the basis of the Prolegomena’s 
distinction—remains central to Kant’s account of experience and continues to 
play a key role in the argument that is its centerpiece: namely, the 
Transcendental Deduction of the categories.3 Second, Kant continues to refer 
to JOPs as such even after 1787.4 Third, he explicitly allows for merely 
subjectively valid judgments in the 1790 Critique of Judgment.5 Finally, he 
himself addresses the change in his terminology in the B-Deduction and insists 
that it does not reflect any substantive change in his argument, which he says 
“is already stated correctly” in the Prolegomena.6  
These factors suggest that the distinction between JOPs and JOEs 
continues to be significant for Kant. Indeed, in this paper, I argue for a novel 
interpretation of the distinction which reveals that it is coherent, compatible 
with Kant’s other commitments and remains consistent across his works. Even 
more importantly, I will argue that it is crucial for understanding the role 
played by the categories in generating objectively valid judgments, and thus, 
for understanding Kant’s argument in the Deduction itself.  
My argument proceeds through the following stages. In §1, I begin by 
considering and rejecting a standard strategy for making sense of the 
distinction between JOPs and JOEs. According to this strategy, when Kant 
claims that JOPs are merely subjectively valid, he has in mind judgments that 
are about perceived objects but that cannot be said to hold for all subjects: 
perhaps because they are made without sufficient investigation or because 
they merely assert how things seem to the subject making the judgment. Any 
reading of this sort, as I see it, overlooks a criterial feature of JOPs: namely, 
that such judgments do not have “relation to the object” (4:300). In other 
words, as I will argue, Kant makes clear that judgments of perception are not 
about the objects of perception, but rather, about perceptions themselves. In §2.1, 
I propose my own interpretation, according to which JOPs should be not be 
 
3 E.g., B139-143. 
4 R3145-6, 16:678-9, between 1790-1804; DWL 24:767, transcript of lectures given in 
the 1790s; JL 9:114, published in 1800. 
5 Namely, judgments of the agreeable. See CJ 5:212; 5:214, 5:217. 
6 MF 4:476. 
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understood as insufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects, but 
rather, as judgments about perceptions that do not represent what the 
perceptions are of as an object independent of the perceptions. After 
developing the details of my account, I show that it can make sense of Kant’s 
seemingly disparate examples. With the positive account on the table, I am in 
a position to respond more fully to the objection that Kant no longer allows 
for JOPs by the time he writes the B-deduction. I do so in §2.2. Next, in §3, I 
respond to four objections to my proposal, each of which argues on different 
grounds that the kinds of judgments I identify as JOPs are not in fact merely 
subjectively valid. 
Finally, in §4, I discuss the key role Kant’s distinction between JOPs and 
JOEs plays in the Transcendental Deduction. Kant signals that one of his 
primary goals in the Deduction is to respond to a Humean skeptic who objects 
that we are not justified in applying a priori categories in experience. I argue 
that whereas the standard reading of the distinction between JOPs and JOEs 
undercuts Kant’s response to Humean skepticism, my account can help 
illuminate it.  
 
1 In the Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes between judgments that claim to be 
“only subjectively valid” [nur subjektiv gültig]—that is, “valid” only for the 
subject making them—and judgments that claim to be “objectively” and 
“universally valid” [objektiv und allgemein gültig]—that is, valid “at all 
times…and for everyone.” (4:298) In the case of the former, he says: 
 
I do not at all require that I should find it so at every time, or that 
everyone else should find it just as I do; they express only a relation 
of two sensations to the same subject, namely myself, and this only in 
my present state of perception, and are therefore not expected to be 
valid for the object: these I call judgments of perception 
[Wahrnehmungsurteile] (4:299). 
 
As for “judgments of experience [Erfahrungsurteile],” he continues, “the case is 
completely different”: “What experience teaches me under certain 
circumstances, it must teach me at every time and teach everyone else as well, 
and its validity is not limited to the subject or its state at that time. Therefore I 
express all such judgments as objectively valid …” (4:299) 
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1.1 The interpretive strategy I will criticize reads passages like this one as 
claiming that JOPs are judgments that are about objects, but that, for one reason 
or another, cannot be said to hold for all subjects.7 I begin by considering 
Beatrice Longuenesse’s account.  On Longuenesse’s reading, all judgments are 
governed by a norm of universal validity for Kant—all judgments, in other 
words, aim to be valid at all times and for all subjects (Longuenesse 1998, 186). 
Nevertheless, she says, individual judgments can “remain ‘subjective’ to a 
greater or lesser degree” (83) depending on the extent to which they “rely 
uncritically” on a subject’s particular circumstances.  
Longuenesse’s discussion of one of Kant’s examples clarifies what she 
thinks is required to make fully objective JOEs. In §20 of the Prolegomena, Kant 
offers as an example of a JOP, “When the sun shines on the stone, it becomes 
warm.”8 He contrasts that judgment with “The sun warms the stone,” which 
he identifies as a JOE (4:301n*). As Longuenesse reads Kant’s example, the 
former expresses an observed correlation between the sun shining and the 
stone growing warm. But merely observing a possibly contingent correlation 
is not sufficient to warrant the judgment that the observed events are actually 
connected in a manner that holds at all times and for all subjects: this is why, 
according to Longuenesse, the judgment in question remains merely 
subjective.9 Converting such a JOP into a JOE that asserts an objective 
connection between the events observed, she argues, requires: 
 
confronting the correlations already obtained with many more, while 
perhaps also using the resources of mathematical construction to 
anticipate and test further possible empirical correlations. Only after 
such a method has been systematically applied can a causal 
connection be asserted: “the sun warms the stone” (Longuenesse 1998, 
179). 
 
 
7 In addition to Longuenesse and Allison, whose views I discuss below, versions of 
this strategy can be found in Friedman 2012, Wolff 2012 and Beizaei 2017. 
8 I have modified the translation of “wenn” from ‘if’ to ‘when’ here. Whereas the 
German ‘wenn’ is ambiguous between ‘if’ and ‘when’ in English, I think the latter 
better conveys the feature of JOPs that Kant emphasizes: namely, that they merely 
report what is the case in “my present state of perception.” (4:299, my emphasis). Cf. 
Longuenesse 1998, 178n26. 
9 Longuenesse 1998, 177-9. The view that JOPs express empirically observed 
correlations of events and/or inductive generalizations based on such observations 
is shared by Friedman 2012, 247, 250; Wolff 2012, 132-5 and Beizaei 2017, 363-4. 
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In Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Henry Allison presents a similar 
account of JOPs. According to Allison, JOPs “express how things seem to a 
subject under certain conditions and, as such, make no claim to 
universalizability.”10 On Allison’s view, then, JOPs are a species of what Kant 
calls “provisional judgments”11—“initial assessments” which “precede 
investigation” and are “subject to revision”(Allison 2015, 305). Since such 
judgments are only made provisionally, Allison explains, they do not claim to 
hold at all times and for all perceivers and so, are merely subjectively valid. 
Like Longuenesse, however, Allison believes that an objectively valid JOE 
only “emerges as the result of [an] investigation in which the weight of the 
reasons for and against the initial assessment has been determined” (305). 
 
1.2 Both Allison and Longuenesse take JOPs to be judgments that are about 
perceived objects, but do not hold for all subjects, either because they are made 
uncritically (Longuenesse) or provisionally (Allison). Though an analysis of 
this sort may indeed seem to be called for by the example discussed above, I 
will now argue that it conflicts with key features of Kant’s description of JOPs.  
For one, Kant says explicitly in the Prolegomena that when a subject 
makes a JOP, what she expresses is “merely a connection of perceptions within 
[her] mental state, without relation to the object [ohne Beziehung auf den 
Gegenstand].”12 Now, in his discussions elsewhere of types of representation, 
as well as of the step-by-step progression [Stufenleiter] between them, Kant 
defines a perception [Wahrnehmung] as “a representation with 
consciousness.”13 He makes clear that by itself, a perception does not yet 
amount to cognition of an object. As he puts it in a Reflexion dated to around 
the same time as the publication of the Prolegomena, consciousness of 
perceptions alone “relates all representation only to our self as modifications 
of our condition; they are in this case…especially not cognitions of any things 
 
10 Allison 2015, 299. See also Allison 2004, 180.  
11 See VL 24:861-2. 
12 4:300, my emphasis. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says the object of 
representations should be understood as that which makes “one way of combining 
the manifold necessary” (A191/B236). What this means, as I understand it, is that 
representations come to have “relation to an object” insofar as the subject takes a 
certain combination of them to be necessary (i.e., correct) in virtue of corresponding 
to the way the object is. See also A104-5.  
13 A320/B376-7. See also JL 9:64-5. ‘Perception’ should be understood broadly here so 
as to include representations recalled by the imagination in the absence of the object. 
I explain this further in §2.1. 
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and are related to no object.”14 As I understand it, Kant’s position is that in being 
conscious of her perceptions alone, a subject is merely conscious of her own 
subjective states. Such consciousness lacks “relation to an object” in the sense 
that the subject does not yet think of what her perceptions are of as an object 
independent of her perceptions. This is the sense in which consciousness of 
perceptions does not yet amount to cognition of an object.15 It also explains 
why Kant says that JOPs do not have “relation to the object.” Since JOPs 
express what the subject is conscious of merely in being conscious of her 
perceptions, JOPs are not about the objects represented by her perceptions, but 
rather, about her perceptions themselves. In contrast, Kant says, a JOE expresses 
not the “relation of a perception to a subject,” but, rather, “a property of an 
object” (4:298). In other words, whenever the subject thinks of what her 
perceptions are of as an object, she makes a JOE.  
For ease of expression, I will henceforth refer to a judgment that has 
“relation to an object” in the above sense as a ‘judgment about objects’, and to 
a judgment about perceptions that lacks “relation to an object” as a ‘judgment 
about perceptions’. In short, then, Kant makes clear in the Prolegomena that a 
JOE is a ‘judgment about objects’, and a JOP is a ‘judgment about 
perceptions’.16  
 
14 R5923, 18:386, 1783-4 (my emphasis). 
15 For a detailed and very helpful account of the difference between perception and 
cognition in Kant that I take my discussion here to align with, see Tolley 2017. See also 
Watkins and Willaschek 2017, 84-7, 101-2. I should note that I take the claim that 
perceptions lack “relation to an object” in this sense to be compatible with their being 
related to objects in less cognitively demanding senses: for example, as being causally 
related to objects or being that in virtue of which particulars are presented. See Allais 
2009, 403-5, and, for a discussion of some other less cognitively demanding senses of 
objectivity, see McLear 2020. In §3.1, I will in effect argue that JOPs do have what 
McLear calls “representational objectivity,” since they can be assessed for truth. But 
this does not mean that they have the kind of ‘relation to an object’ that I take to be at 
issue here, since they are about perceptions, rather than about the objects represented 
by those perceptions. In contrast, it is clear that judgments like (1) and (2) above—
which Allison and Longuenesse count as JOPs—are ‘related to objects’ in precisely 
the cognitively demanding sense of being about the objects represented by 
perceptions. 
16 It might be objected here that JOPs must take perceptions themselves—or 
alternatively, the subject who has them—as objects. As I will discuss, however, to 
represent something “as an object” in the relevant sense for Kant is to represent it as 
fully determined in accordance with the categories (especially the relational 
categories). And, as I will argue below, JOPs do not represent perceptions—or the 
subject who has them—as an object in this sense. In order to do so, the subject must 
think of perceptions themselves as governed by causal laws. When she does this, 
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This key feature disqualifies the kinds of judgments that Allison and 
Longuenesse count as JOPs. Consider the following judgments, for example: 
 
(1) “When the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm,” 
understood as expressing an observed correlation between external events.17  
 
(2) “The sun warms the stone,” asserted either uncritically or 
provisionally.  
 
Both (1) and (2) are quite obviously about the objects of a subject’s perceptions, 
rather than about the perceptions themselves. (1) expresses a perceived 
correlation between the sun shining and the stone becoming warm; (2), 
whether it is made uncritically or merely provisionally, is about the perceived 
effect of the sun on the stone. Both judgments have the ‘relation to objects’ that 
JOPs are said to lack. As such, they cannot be JOPs by Kant’s lights. To put the 
point generally: uncritical or provisional judgments about objects are still 
judgments about objects, and this entails that they are JOEs on Kant’s view, 
not JOPs.  
Second, while Longuenesse and Allison claim that what is required to 
convert JOPs into JOEs is further empirical investigation and the weighing of 
reasons, Kant in fact says that what must be added to a JOP is “beyond the 
empirical and in general beyond what is given in sensory intuition.” The only 
element missing from a JOP, he is clear, is a priori—“special concepts originally 
generated in the understanding”—in other words, the categories (4:297-8).18 
But (1) and (2) above are not missing the application of a category: in 
 
however, she makes a JOE rather than a JOP. The latter type of JOE complicates my 
shorthand above, since it amounts to a ‘judgment about objects’ that is about 
perceptions. Since this complication does not bear on the bulk of my discussion, 
however, I retain the shorthand and clarify when necessary. None of Kant’s examples 
consist in judgments of this sort, nor do the commentators I criticize discuss them. I 
say more about such judgments in §3.4 and nn. 63-4. 
17 Kant indeed offers this very judgment as an example of a JOP in the Prolegomena, 
but I will argue below that, as such, it should be understood as referring to the 
subject’s perceptions of the sun shining and the stone becoming warm, rather than to 
the corresponding external events. As I will explain, I believe Kant struggles to 
identify the correct way to formulate his examples so that they exhibit the features he 
ascribes to JOPs in the Prolegomena. His later examples go some distance towards 
rectifying this.   
18 I discuss Kant’s claim at length in §3.2 below. There, I argue that converting JOPs 
to JOEs specifically requires the addition of one of the relational categories. 
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particular, the connection that these judgments assert between the sun shining 
and the stone growing warm has already been subsumed under the category 
of cause. This is obviously true of (2), which claims (albeit uncritically or 
provisionally) that the sunshine causes the stone to become warm. But it is also 
true of (1), since per Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy, even 
representing an objective temporal succession of events—such as the stone’s 
growing warm after the sun shines on it—requires application of the category 
of cause.19 In sum, since both (1) and (2) are fully determined by the categories, 
it would be incorrect to count them as JOPs, as Allison and Longuenesse do. 
Third, it follows from Allison’s and especially from Longuenesse’s 
view that many of our ordinary judgments should turn out to be JOPs, since it 
is unlikely that such judgments are made with the systematic scrutiny and 
investigation that they believe is required for making JOEs. However, in an 
important Reflexion, which is repeated in the Jäsche Logic, Kant makes clear 
that, on his view, most of our judgments are, in fact, JOEs: a JOP, he says, “is 
really not possible, except insofar as I express my representation as a 
perception.”20 What is not possible, as I understand it, is making a JOP about 
objects—and, of course, that is what the majority of our judgments are about. 
JOPs, as Kant says, are only possible insofar as they refer to perceptions. 
This lack of fit between Kant’s text and the views under consideration 
obtains, I believe, because they conflate what may be necessary to fully justify 
a JOE with what is necessary simply to make such a judgment, whether 
justifiably or not. While systematic investigation and the weighing of evidence 
may be necessary to fully justify the claim that one’s judgment holds for all 
subjects, it is not necessary simply for making such a claim in the first place. 
For example, a subject quite obviously need not go through the procedure 
Longuenesse describes—viz., “confronting the correlations already obtained 
with many more, while perhaps also using the resources of mathematical 
construction”—simply in order to claim that the sun warms a stone.21  
 
19 A189/B232-A211/B257. Interpreting Kant as allowing that we can represent 
temporal successions of events and express inductive generalizations on this basis 
without applying the category of cause conflicts with the Second Analogy, and—as I 
will discuss in §4—undercuts Kant’s argument against Hume. This point of criticism 
also applies to the accounts of JOPs defended in Friedman 2012; Wolff 2012; and 
Beizaei 2017. 
20 R3145, 16:678; JL, 9:114. My emphasis.  
21 Friedman recognizes that this is also a possible problem for his view, according to 
which only “well-established laws of empirical natural science” count as genuinely 
Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity 
 
 9 
For Kant, any judgment that so much as claims universal validity—
whether it does so hastily or provisionally—is by that token a JOE. This is 
reflected in his language throughout the discussion in the Prolegomena: in 
order to make a JOE, he says, the subject need only “regard” [ansehen], “deem” 
[halten], “express” [aussprechen], “want” or “intend” [wollen] her judgment to 
be universally valid (4:298-9). Moreover, he makes clear that a subject 
expresses the claim that her judgment is universally valid simply in virtue of 
making a judgment that is about objects rather than about her own 
perceptions. For, as he says, when we make a judgment about an object, we 
thereby: 
 
intend [wollen] that the judgment should also be valid at all times for 
us and for everyone else; for if a judgment agrees with an object, then 
all judgments of the same object must also agree with one another, 
and hence the objective validity of a judgment of experience signifies 
nothing other than its necessary universal validity.22 (4:298) 
 
When a subject makes a judgment about an object, in other words, she 
“intends” or claims that the object is the way she represents it to be. This 
amounts to claiming that her judgment is objectively valid. And in virtue of 
claiming that the object is the way she represents it to be, she in effect claims 
that others ought to represent it that way as well—she claims, in other words, 
that her judgment is universally valid.23 Now, it is perfectly possible—and 
indeed, common—for subjects to make such claims without sufficient 
 
objective JOEs (2012, 261). As Friedman worries, this appears to entail that there was 
“no genuinely objective experience before Newton established the law of universal 
gravitation in the Principia…” (262-3) He responds to this worry by clarifying his 
account, such that objectively valid judgments need not be explicitly incorporated 
into scientific theory, but need only be “capable of such incorporation.” (263) Of 
course, the merely inductive generalizations that Friedman takes to be expressed by 
JOPs are typically capable of incorporation into scientific theory; as a result, Friedman 
is forced to conclude that JOPs are themselves objectively valid (264), and thus to 
deny the very feature that Kant takes to be criterial of them. 
22 The ‘necessity’ here should be understood as normative necessity, since Kant’s claim 
applies equally to contingent judgments as he makes clear at 4:305n*. See Allison 
2015, 294-5. 
23 This is also true for the provisional judgments about objects described by Allison. 
When a subject makes a provisional judgment, she claims that it is the correct 
judgment to make given her evidence, even though she recognizes the insufficiency of 
her evidence. This amounts to claiming that any subject judging on the basis of the 
same evidence ought to make the same provisional judgment. 
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investigation. But insufficiently justified judgments about objects are still 
judgments about objects and so, are not JOPs by Kant’s lights. 
On my view, then, the interpretations I have been considering set too 
high a bar on JOEs and in so doing, wrongly count too many judgments as 
JOPs. I have argued that any judgment that makes a claim about objects claims 
objective validity and is by that token a JOE. Correspondingly, only judgments 
that are not about the objects of perception but rather about perceptions 
themselves count as JOPs for Kant. In the next section, I turn my attention to 
the latter. 
 
2.1 I have been arguing that JOPs are correctly understood as judgments about 
a subject’s perceptions rather than the objects of her perception.24 More 
specifically, as I will now argue, JOPs report sequences of perceptions that a 
subject finds herself having as a result of her reproductive imagination. 
 In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant identifies the imagination as 
“the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition.” 
(B151) He describes the role played by the reproductive imagination in 
 
24 On this point, my account is closest to the extended account of judgments of 
perception developed in Prauss 1971. However, I diverge from Prauss on a number 
of key points. Prauss claims that Kant fails to identify a formulation of JOPs on which 
they genuinely refer to perceptions rather than objects (175). According to Prauss, this 
is the case for all of Kant’s examples, such as “When the sun shines on the stone, it 
becomes warm,” or even “Sugar is sweet.” The former, he argues, must be reading as 
expressing an objective succession of events, and the latter as ascribing a certain 
(secondary) property to an object (i.e., sugar) (180, 185-8). In place of Kant’s 
formulations, Prauss argues that it is “It seems…”-judgments (“Es scheint…”-Urteile) 
that genuinely satisfy the conditions that must be met by JOPs since, according to 
him, such judgments express the subject’s perceptions and make no claim about the 
objects of those perceptions (224-53). Thus, according to Prauss, the judgment “It 
seems that the sun warms the stone,” for example, counts as a genuine JOP (234). 
Even though that judgment obviously involves the category of cause, Prauss argues 
that it merely involves a use (Gebrauch) of it, not an application (Anwendung) (251-3, 
272-92). As will become clear, I disagree with Prauss that Kant’s examples must be 
understood to refer to objects rather than perceptions. In this section, I will argue that 
they should instead be understood as expressing a subjective temporal sequence of 
perceptions, rather than a succession of objective events. In §3.2, I will argue that this is 
the case despite Prauss’ worry that such judgments employ objective concepts, such 
as “sun,” “stone” or “sugar”. Moreover, Prauss’ proposed formulation conflicts with 
Kant’s claim that it is precisely by adding a missing (relational) category—not by 
subtracting an “It seems” from a judgment that already contains the category—that 
we transform a JOP into a JOE. As such, I believe he also fails to correctly capture the 
role Kant’s distinction plays in his deduction of the categories. I discuss this role in 
§4. 
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particular as follows. First, it is only in virtue of the reproductive imagination 
that a subject can be aware of a “series of perceptions,” for it is what allows 
her to reproduce “a perception, from which the mind has passed on to 
another” (A121).25 As she scans the façade of a house, for example, it is the 
reproductive imagination that allows her to recall and thus to keep in mind the 
door as she moves on to perceiving the windows. Second, the reproductive 
imagination is also responsible for calling representations to mind on the basis 
of psychological associations that a subject has acquired as a result of her past 
experiences (A121). As she looks at the façade of a house, for example, 
associations with other houses she has previously experienced might make it 
the case that she expects this house to also have side and back walls, even 
though she cannot currently see them.26  
These examples demonstrate why Kant takes the reproductive 
imagination to “be a necessary ingredient of perception itself” (A120n*). 
Without it, he says, the subject could only be aware, at any moment, of the 
individual, isolated perception she was having at that very moment (A120). It 
is the reproductive imagination that allows her to bring to mind perceptions 
other than the one she is currently aware of, and thus, to be aware of the kind 
of sequence of perceptions that go into, for example, the complex 
representation of a house (A121). 
 Now, Kant frequently explains the distinction between representations 
that are combined objectively as opposed to merely subjectively in terms of 
whether the representations are related by the understanding or merely by the 
reproductive imagination, respectively. In §18 of the B-deduction, for 
example, Kant distinguishes between what he calls the “objective” and the 
“subjective” “unity of consciousness.” Whereas “subjective unity” has 
“merely subjective validity” and occurs “through association of the 
representations” (B140), “objective unity” results when representations are 
“united in a concept of the object.” (B139) In §19, Kant again differentiates a 
relation between representations that counts as an “objective unity” and 
“belong[s] to the understanding” from a relation that obtains “in accordance 
with the laws of reproductive imagination (which has only subjective 
validity).” (B141)  
 
25 More specifically, the reproductive imagination is necessary for the subject to be 
aware of a series of perceptions as a series.  
26 See Strawson 1970, esp. 39-41. 
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Kant’s point in these passages, as I understand it, is as follows. On his 
view, a subject’s reproductive imagination can make it the case that a 
representation RB is called up for her while she has representation RA in 
mind—either because RB preceded RA and is recalled by the imagination, or 
because of an association the subject has between As and Bs. When this occurs, 
the subject passively finds herself thinking the sequence of representations 
<RA, RB>. Now, such passive awareness by itself does not involve any claim 
about the correctness or incorrectness of these representations being combined 
as they are—that is, about whether the objects A and B that the representations 
are of are actually related. Rather, the subject is simply aware of what Kant 
calls the “subjective unity” of RA and RB. In contrast, the subject can actively 
relate RA and RB through her understanding. That is, she can judge that the 
objects A and B are actually related, and so, in effect, that RA and RB are correctly 
combined and the sequence <RA, RB> is universally valid. This is what Kant 
calls awareness of the “objective unity” of RA and RB. 
This analysis of §§18 and 19 maps onto my preliminary discussion of 
Kant’s distinction between JOPs and JOEs in §1 above. In the Prolegomena, as 
we saw, Kant says that JOPs are merely subjectively valid because they express 
“merely a connection of perceptions within my mental state without relation 
to the object.” (4:300) What Kant adds in the Critique (and elsewhere27) is that 
the “connection of perceptions” that are expressed by merely subjectively 
valid JOPs are due to the reproductive imagination28; in contrast, the connections 
expressed by objectively valid JOEs are due to the understanding.29 
 
27 See also R3051: “The representation of the way in which different concepts…belong 
to one consciousness…is the judgment. They belong to one consciousness partly in 
accordance with laws of the imagination, thus subjectively, or of the understanding, i.e., 
objectively valid for every being that has understanding.” (16:633, my emphasis)  
28 I should note here that I do not take the imagination’s reproduction of 
representations to itself be an act of judgment. Neither do I think that being conscious 
of such reproduced representations requires making a JOP. My claim is only that it is 
possible for a subject to make a judgment that merely reports a series of 
representations she finds herself having due to her reproductive imagination. When 
she does so, on my view, she makes a JOP. 
29 Thus, I agree with Brigitte Sassen that the Prolegomena’s JOPs reappear in the first 
Critique as expressions of “unities of consciousness based merely on principles of 
association” (Sassen 2008, 269). Sassen also notes that JOPs are meant to lack the 
relation to objects that is secured by the categories (272, 276); however, she does not 
appear to understand this in the way I do here, since what it turns out she takes these 
judgments to be lacking  (like Longuenesse and Allison) is  knowledge (278) or certainty 
(284) that the connections between objects that they express actually obtain. 
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In what follows, I will argue that we can make good sense of the various 
examples of JOPs Kant offers in these terms.30 First, however, it will be useful 
to introduce an example of the kind of circumstance in which it might strike 
us as more appropriate to make a JOP rather than a JOE.31  
Consider the following circumstance. Say that in my childhood, my 
mother frequently made coffee while the neighbor’s rooster crowed, and so 
the sound of a rooster crowing has become associated with the smell of coffee 
for me. Visiting a farm one day, I hear a rooster crow and find myself 
imagining the smell of coffee. Now let’s assume that I am aware of my 
association and realize that there is no coffee being made nearby. As a result, 
I do not judge that the sequence (<RROOSTER, RCOFFEE>) corresponds to an objective 
connection between the rooster crowing and coffee, or that any other subject 
hearing the rooster ought to represent coffee as well. Rather, I merely report 
the subjective order of my representations through the following judgment:  
 
(3')32 “My representation of the rooster crowing is followed by my 
representation of the smell of coffee.”  
 
 
30 Cf. Bird 1962, 142; Beck 1978, 51-2; Kotzin and Baumgärtner 1990; Sassen 2008, 275, 
284; Prauss 1971, 176-93. 
31 Kant himself attempts to provide examples of judgments which “could [n]ever 
become judgments of experience” in the Prolegomena: “that the room is warm, the 
sugar sweet, the wormwood repugnant.” (4:299) Unfortunately, however, these 
examples have been the cause of more confusion than clarity. One source of confusion 
is that these examples rely on the view—which Kant holds in the Prolegomena—that 
sensations of warmth and sweetness make a subject aware of secondary qualities, and 
secondary qualities cannot (at least correctly) be ascribed to objects. But Kant does 
not consistently treat sensations corresponding to secondary qualities in this way (for 
example, he calls such sensations ‘objective’ at CJ 5:206.) The example I offer above 
sidesteps these worries. I discuss Kant’s examples involving secondary qualities 
further in n. 41. Pollok takes Kant’s apparent change of heart about secondary 
qualities in the CJ to entail that at least by this point, he only counts judgments that 
articulate feelings as JOPs (Pollok 2008, 338-9). As I discuss above, I agree that Kant’s 
later examples of JOPs better illustrate that he does not intend such judgments to 
ascribe any qualities to objects. This does not entail, however, that such judgments 
only express feelings; rather, as I argue, they express mere connections of perceptions 
(including, but not limited to, feelings) that are not determined to correspond to 
objects. 
32 In my subsequent discussion of Kant’s examples, I will use (n') to number the JOPs 
that refer explicitly to representations and (n) for the corresponding colloquial 
judgments. 
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Or, equivalently, and far more colloquially:  
 
(3) “When I hear(d) the rooster crow, I imagine(d) the smell of coffee.”  
 
Neither (3) nor (3') assert an objective connection between roosters and coffee; 
rather, they are about a sequence in my representations that is due to my 
imaginative associations. As such, I argue, they are genuine JOPs by Kant’s 
lights. 
I believe that we should read Kant’s various examples of JOPs in the 
same way. In §19, Kant offers the following as an example of a judgment that 
has “only subjective validity”: 
 
(4) “When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight.”33  
 
He contrasts this with the “objectively valid” judgment: 
 
(5) “It, the body, is heavy.” (B142) 
 
Kant characterizes the sequence of representations expressed by (4) as 
occurring “in accordance with the laws of association”; in contrast, he says, (5) 
does not claim that the relevant representations are merely “found together in 
perception” but rather that they are “are combined in the object.” We can flesh 
out this discussion in a manner similar to my example of the rooster above. 
Say that because of her previous experiences with bodies, a subject has 
acquired an association between bodies and weight; this association makes it 
the case that when she now lifts a body, she finds herself imaginatively 
anticipating a feeling of weight. As a result, she has the sequence of 
representations <RBODY, RWEIGHT>, which she reports through (4) “When I carry 
a body, I feel a pressure of weight.” Here, just as in the example of the rooster 
above, (4) should be understood as describing a sequence of perceptions had 
by the subject: as reporting, that is, that her perceptions of carrying a body are 
followed by her anticipating the feeling of weight. In other words, it should be 
read as equivalent to: 
 
 
33 Once again, I have modified the translation of “wenn” from ‘if’ to ‘when.’ See n. 8 
above. 
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 (4') “My representation of carrying a body is followed my 
representation of weight.” 
 
 Just like (3) and (3') above, neither (4) nor (4') claim that the sequence of 
representations had by the subject corresponds to an objective connection 
between bodies and weight.34 Rather, they express “only a relation of two 
sensations to the same subject…and this only in [her] present state of 
perception.” (4:299) As such, they are merely subjectively valid. In order to 
make a judgment about the object her perceptions are of, it is not sufficient 
that the subject merely report a sequence of representations that she finds 
herself having as a result of her reproductive imagination. Rather, she must 
actively relate those representations through an act of the understanding in 
accordance with a category. She must judge, in other words, that RBODY and 
RWEIGHT are correctly combined because bodies and weight are objectively 
connected. What is required in order to express such a judgment—as we have 
seen Kant argue in the Prolegomena—is the addition of a category.35 In this case, 
the subject subsumes the represented relation under the category of substance-
inherence, thereby judging that bodies are related to weight as subject to 
property. In other words, as Kant says, she judges that (5) “Bodies are heavy.” 
Of course, it is hard to hear (4') as a judgment one might naturally make 
upon carrying a body and feeling its weight. Note, however, that this is in 
contrast with my example of the rooster above, in which it was the JOP (3) 
“When I hear a rooster crow, I imagine the smell of coffee” that seemed more 
natural than any JOE that would assert an objective connection between 
roosters and coffee (such as the false judgment that a rooster’s crowing causes 
the smell of coffee). In that case, since there is no objective connection between 
roosters and the smell of coffee, we know that the connection between the 
subject’s representations is a merely subjective one. In contrast, since there 
obviously does exist an objective connection between bodies and weight, the 
corresponding JOE in (5) strikes us as far more natural. Despite this, however, 
it is genuinely possible to make the relatively unnatural judgment in each case: 
that is, to make a judgment about the representations of bodies and weight in 
the former case, and a judgment that asserts an objective connection between 
 
34 Another way to put this is that the truth conditions for the judgment are set by my 
representations, not by the objects represented. See §3.1 below. 
35 Specifically, a relational category. See §3.2 below. 
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roosters and coffee in the latter. On my view, it is these two possibilities—and 
how one moves from the former to the latter by the addition of a category—
that Kant has in mind in each of his examples. 
Correspondingly, I believe we should analyze the example discussed 
above from the Prolegomena in the same way:  
 
(1) “When the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm.”  
 
Though (1) seems to report a correlation observed between perceived events 
(indeed, this is precisely why Longuenesse and others36 read it as they do), I 
think Kant simply fails to make explicit in his examples the very feature he 
stresses in his description of JOPs in the Prolegomena—namely, that such 
judgments are about perceptions rather than objects. Interestingly, in the 
passage from the Jäsche Logic I cited above, Kant gives another example of a 
JOP that involves warm stones, in which he is clearer. “In touching the stone I 
sense warmth,” he says, “is a JOP: but on the other hand, The stone is warm, is a 
judgment of experience.”37 This indicates, I think, how we are meant to read 
Kant’s example in the Prolegomena. Once again, it should be read as expressing 
a sequence of representations (<RSUN SHINING, RSTONE BECOMING WARM>):  
 
(1') “My representation of the sun shining on the stone is followed by 
my representation of the stone becoming warm.”38 
 
Reading (1') for (1) differentiates it from a judgment in which the represented 
relation has already been subsumed under a category. The latter is the case for 
judgment (2) “The sun warms the stone,” and indeed, as I argued above, for 
(1) itself if it is understood as referring to an objective succession of external 
events, since both presuppose the application of the category of cause. 
Now, one might worry here that I am not entitled to reinterpret (1) as a 
judgment about perceptions, since it clearly seems to refer to external events. If 
Kant really meant to refer to perceptions of the sun and the stone in his example, 
 
36 Longuenesse 1998, 177-9. See also Friedman 2012, 246-7, 261-2; Wolff 2012, 134-
5n16. 
37 JL 9:114. See also R3145-6, where Kant also provides the example, “I sense warmth 
in touching the oven,” as contrasted to “The oven is warm.” (16:678-9) 
38 Or more colloquially, “When I see the sun shining on the stone, I feel it becoming 
warm.” 
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in other words, why does he not say so? To respond to this concern, I want to 
briefly discuss another of Kant’s examples from the Prolegomena: 
 
(6) “Air is elastic.” 
 
Interestingly, Kant says that (6) can express either a JOP or a JOE, depending 
on whether it refers merely to a relation between the subject’s perceptions or 
to objects (4:299-300). In the former case, as I understand it, (6) should be 
understood as referring to a subject’s perceptions of what amounts to the air’s 
elasticity: for example, to the fact that her perception of heating air (say, the 
air in a closed container) is followed by her perception of it expanding (say, 
when the container explodes).39 In contrast, for (6) to count as a JOE, Kant says, 
the perception of air has to have been “subsumed under a concept of the 
understanding.” “For example,” he continues, one might judge that “the air 
belongs under the concept of cause, which determines the judgment about the 
air as hypothetical with respect to expansion.” In other words, one might 
judge that heating air causes it to expand. Thus, in Kant’s example, the 
judgment (6) “Air is elastic” could be understood as equivalent to: 
 
(6') “My representation of heating air is followed by my 
representation of air expanding.” (JOP)  
 
or 
 
(7) “Heating air causes it to expand.” (JOE)40 
 
This shows that, in the Prolegomena, Kant clearly does allow a judgment like 
(6) that seemingly refers to objects to be disambiguated such that it is 
understood to refer instead to perceptions.  I argue that this licenses us to 
 
39 For a different analysis of this example, cf. Longuenesse 1998, 176-7; Allison 2015, 
301-3; Wolff 2012, 132-5; Beizaei 2017, 359. 
40 Or one might just as well judge that (8) “When air is heated, it expands.” As I 
discussed in §1 above, if (8) is understood to refer to a sequence of objective events, 
then per Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy, it presupposes that that sequence 
is taken to be causally determined. As such, it is a JOE that involves the application 
of the category of cause just as much as (7) does. 
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apply the same procedure when interpreting his example of the sun shining 
on the stone, as I do above.41  
Of course, Kant does not help his case by making his examples so open 
to misinterpretation. In the Prolegomena, as I mentioned, I believe he is still 
struggling to find the right way to articulate examples of the kind of judgment 
he has in mind so that it is clear that they refer to perceptions rather than 
objects (as his own definitions there require). As we have seen, he is already 
(somewhat) clearer in the example he provides in the B-deduction, and 
declares in so many words in the Jäsche Logic that a JOP is only possible if it 
refers to perceptions. The example offered in the Jäsche Logic does finally make 
fully explicit that a JOP is meant to be about the subject’s perceptions: “I, who 
perceive a tower, perceive in it the red color,” as distinguished from the JOE, 
“It [the tower] is red.” (9:114)  
On my view, then, we can give a consistent account of JOPs that makes 
sense of Kant’s examples while avoiding the criticisms I raised for the standard 
interpretive strategy in §1. For as I have argued we should understand them, 
Kant’s examples of JOPs: 
 
(i) Are about perceptions rather than objects, and so, do not violate 
Kant’s claim that JOPs lack ‘relation to the object.’ 
 
(ii) Only require the addition of a category to be converted into JOEs.  
 
(iii) Are not common, since most of our judgments are not about 
sequences in our own perceptions, but rather about objects. This is 
 
41 The same goes for the examples I mentioned in n. 31 above: “that the room is warm, 
the sugar sweet, the wormwood repugnant.” (4:299) On my view, these judgments 
should also be understood as expressing sequences in a subject’s representations, 
while leaving undetermined whether or not objects really are the way they are 
represented as being. Just as above, then, I believe these judgments should be 
disambiguated as follows: a) ‘My perception of the room is combined with a 
perception of warmth,’ or more colloquially, ‘When I am in the room, I feel warm’; b) 
‘My perception of sugar is combined with a perception of sweetness’ or ‘When I taste 
sugar, I taste sweetness’; c) ‘My perception of wormwood is combined with a feeling 
of displeasure’ or ‘When I taste wormwood, I feel displeasure.’ My translation of this 
set of examples is similar to Prauss’; however, Prauss argues that stated as such, they 
fail to adequately exemplify what makes JOPs subjectively valid in general and so, 
are abandoned by Kant (Prauss 1971, 185-8). 
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in line with Kant’s prediction in the Jäsche Logic that JOPs “are really 
not possible” unless they refer to perceptions. 
 
Let me sum up the account I am proposing here by returning to the key terms 
under discussion. I have been arguing that a sequence of perceptions is 
objectively valid if and only if what the perceptions represent is thought to be 
combined in the objects the perceptions are of. Correspondingly, a JOE is a 
judgment that claims that what is represented by a certain sequence of 
perceptions is combined in the objects the perceptions are of. In order to do 
this, the JOE must represent what the perceptions are of as an object, which, as 
we have seen amounts to subsuming it under the categories. 
In contrast, a sequence of perceptions is merely subjectively valid if and 
only if what the perceptions represent is not thought to be combined in the 
objects the perceptions are of. Correspondingly, a JOP is a judgment that 
claims merely that a certain sequence of perceptions is had by a subject and 
does not claim that what is represented by the perceptions is combined in the 
objects the perceptions are of.42  
 
2.2 In §2.1, I argued that Kant’s distinction between JOPs and JOEs can be 
fleshed out by appealing to his discussion of the difference between merely 
subjective and objective validity in the first Critique. Let me pause here to 
consider the important question of whether Kant continues to allow for the 
possibility of JOPs by the time he writes the B-deduction. If he does not, then 
not only am I not entitled to map the Prolegomena’s distinction between JOPs 
and JOEs onto the B-Deduction’s distinction between subjective and objective 
validity, but it would also be textually inaccurate and misleading to suggest—
as I will go on to do—that the former distinction continues to play an 
important role in the argument of the B-deduction. The worry is as follows: in 
§19 of the B-deduction, Kant explicitly defines judgment as a way of 
combining representations so that they are objectively valid (B141). And this 
 
42 As we can see from my discussion above, I take JOPs to refer to perceptions by 
specifying their content, where this content does not include a characterization of 
what is represented as an object (i.e., a fully categorially determined object). I hope to 
remain neutral here about whether perceptions count as having content 
independently of thought about them, and also whether perception in Kant should 
be understood in relationalist or representationalist terms. See McLear 2016 for a 
discussion of these issues. 
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seems to entail that he has changed his mind and no longer allows for the 
merely subjectively valid JOPs discussed in the Prolegomena.43  
I think this is the wrong conclusion to reach, however. Though Kant 
does indeed present a new definition of judgment in §19, there are a number 
of reasons not to read this as signaling that there has been a substantive change 
in his position between the publication of the Prolegomena in 1783 and the B-
Deduction in 1787.44 For one, just a few lines after stating his new definition in 
§19, he offers an example of something a subject “could...say” that, as I have 
already discussed, shares all the features of the Prolegomena’s JOPs: namely, 
(4) “When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight.” Just like in the 
Prolegomena, as we have seen, Kant characterizes (4) as having “only subjective 
validity,” and proceeds to contrast it with the “objectively valid” judgment (5) 
“It, the body is heavy,” arguing once again that it is the addition of a category 
that distinguishes the latter judgment from the former (B142). This indicates, I 
believe, that the Prolegomena’s distinction continues to be central to Kant’s 
purposes in the B-deduction, even if he has decided there to reserve the term 
‘judgment’ for the Prolegomena’s JOEs.  
Further evidence that Kant continues to allow that JOPs are possible is 
also to be found in the fact that he returns to referring to them by that name in 
Reflexionen dated to the period after the publication of the B-edition.45 
Additionally, in the Critique of Judgment—published in 1790—Kant explicitly 
allows for judgments of the agreeable, which he describes as merely 
subjectively valid judgments, thus demonstrating that he continues to allow 
for a more capacious use of the term ‘judgment’ that applies to merely 
subjectively valid judgments.46  
Keeping this in mind, I suggest that the apparent conflict between the 
B-deduction and Kant’s other writings can be resolved as follows. We can 
grant that within the context of the B-deduction, Kant opts to use the term 
‘judgment’ in a narrow sense so that it applies only to cases in which 
representations are actively combined by the understanding.47 Indeed, Kant 
 
43 See Kemp Smith 1918, 289; Beck 1978, 50; Guyer 1987, 101-2; Kotzin and 
Baumgärtner 1990, 407; Pollok 2008, 335-6; Sassen 2008, 271-2, 281.  
44 See Longuenesse 1998, 82-4, 186; Prauss 1971, 168-72.  
45 See R3145-6, dated between 1790-1804 (16:678-9). 
46 See, e.g., CJ 5:212; 5:214, 5:217. 
47 As an anonymous referee suggests, another way to put this is that in the B-
Deduction, Kant is specifically interested in the class of judgments that constitute 
cognition of an object.  
Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity 
 
 21 
signals as much in a note added to the preface of the Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science (published in 1786, between the Prolegomena and the B-
edition). In the note, Kant explains that “as [he] now understand[s] it,” the 
Deduction’s justification of the categories “can almost be accomplished 
through a single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment 
in general (an action through which given representations first become cognitions of 
an object).”48 Understood in this way, of course, the term ‘judgment’ becomes 
synonymous with the Prolegomena’s ‘judgments of experience,’ as I have 
argued we should understand the latter term.  
Using the term in its restricted sense lends rhetorical strength to Kant’s 
argument in the B-Deduction, since it allows him to claim that the Categories 
are necessary conditions on judgment in general.49 This change does not mean, 
however, that Kant no longer allows that representations can be merely 
passively combined by the reproductive imagination, and indeed, that we can 
be conscious of and report these passive and merely subjective combinations: 
as we have seen, he describes the contrast between objective and subjective 
unity in these very terms in §§18 and 19 of the B-deduction itself. As Kant is 
quick to point out in the note in the Metaphysical Foundations, his more 
“precisely determined definition” only improves the “manner of 
 
48 MF 4:475-6, my emphasis.  
49 We can find historical motivations for Kant’s rhetorical shift. In the note included 
in the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant is responding to a review by Johann Schultz of 
Johann August Heinrich Ulrich’s Institutiones Logicae et Metaphysicae, which was 
published in 1785. As part of his review of Ulrich’s discussion of Kant’s Critique in 
that work, Schultz complains that the A-edition of the Critique seems to entail that the 
categories are conditions even for what the Prolegomena would count as a JOP. With 
respect to the argument of the Second Analogy, for example, Schultz points out that 
one would have to “know that the sunlight is the cause of the warmth of the stone in 
order to be able to say: when the sun shines, the stone grows warm.” (In Sassen 2000, 
213) (Note that Schultz’s complaint is valid if we understand Kant’s example in the 
Prolegomena in the way that Longuenesse does, but not if we understand it as I suggest 
we should in (1') above.) As part of his response, as we have seen, Kant opts to restrict 
the term ‘judgment’ for acts of the understanding for the sake of clarity, since it allows 
him to state unequivocally that the categories are conditions only of the latter. As I 
argue above, however, this does not mean that he no longer believes combinations of 
representations that are due to the reproductive imagination are possible, and 
moreover, that we can be conscious of and report such representations. In fact, as we 
have seen, he provides an example of just such a combination in §19, which does not 
suffer from the ambiguity of his examples in the Prolegomena that engenders Schultz’s 
complaint. For further discussion of the Second Analogy and its relation to Kant’s 
distinction, see §3.3 below. For an extended discussion of Schultz’s review and Kant’s 
reception of it, see Allison, 2015, 306-15. 
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presentation,” not “the ground of explanation,” which, he insists “is already 
stated correctly” in his previous discussions.50  
Now, we could easily abide by Kant’s terminology in the B-deduction 
by expressing the distinction we have been discussing as holding, for example, 
between the objectively valid judgments that are a result of the activity of the 
understanding and merely subjectively valid reports about representations 
that are passively combined due to the reproductive imagination. This would 
be a merely semantic choice, however, and would not alter the content or 
relevance of the distinction at hand.51 Since the Prolegomena’s terminology is 
both better known and more widely used by Kant, I have chosen to express 
the distinction as holding between JOEs and JOPs in this paper. And, more 
substantively, I have argued that it is the very same distinction that continues 
to play an essential role in both the Prolegomena and the Critique and so, that 
Kant’s discussion in the former can fruitfully be brought to bear on his 
discussion in the latter, and vice versa. 
 
3 In this section, I respond to four objections, each of which argues in a 
different way that the kinds of judgments about perceptions that I have been 
treating as JOPs are not in fact merely subjectively valid. 
 
3.1 Judgments about sequences in a subject’s perceptions have a truth value. 
They are true just in case the subject really does have the sequence of 
perceptions they report her to have. According to the first objection I will 
consider, the fact that judgments about perceptions have a truth value entails 
that they are not merely subjectively valid. In his well-known paper, “Did the 
Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams,” for example, Beck argues for this point 
as follows. Judgments “about associations of ideas,” he says, “if correct…are 
correct for everyone.” Such a judgment, he continues, “is valid (true) for me in 
the sense that it is claimed to be true of me. Yet this judgment is objectively 
valid, for it…is a judgment of experience about which others can have 
evidence and on which they must agree if it is true.”52 To put the point 
 
50 MF 4:476. Since Pollok takes Kant to have substantively revised his view between 
the Prolegomena and the B-Deduction, he must treat Kant’s insistence that the change 
merely concerns the “manner of presentation” as a significant mischaracterization 
(Pollok 2008, 342).  
51 On this point, I agree with Friedman 2012, 262 and Allison 2015, 369. 
52 Beck 1978, 53. See also Bird 1962, 145; Kotzin and Baumgärtner 1990, 410. 
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succinctly: if a judgment about my perceptions is true, then it is true for all 
subjects. But this just means that it is not merely subjectively valid, but, rather, 
universally and objectively valid. 
 Though the objection is an initially compelling one, I think it goes 
wrong in equating the objective validity of a judgment with its having a truth 
value.53 Though every judgment that has objective validity has a truth value, 
not every judgment that has a truth value is objectively valid. I have argued 
that a judgment claims objective validity if and only if it claims that what is 
represented by a certain sequence of perceptions is combined in the objects the 
perceptions are of. But a JOP does not do this. Rather, it merely reports a 
sequence of perceptions the subject finds herself with, without claiming that 
what is represented by the perceptions is combined in the objects the 
perceptions are of. It is for this reason, on my view, that JOPs remain merely 
subjectively valid. Now, as I said above, a JOP is true if the subject really had 
the sequence of perceptions it reports her as having. And others can and 
typically should accept the truth of such a judgment on the basis of the 
subject’s testimony about her own perceptual states. Thus, a true JOP is indeed 
true for all subjects.54 But this is compatible with its lacking objective validity, 
since it makes no claim about the objects the perceptions are of.  
In sum, both objectively valid and merely subjectively valid judgments 
have a truth value. An objectively valid JOE is true if the objects represented 
by a sequence of perceptions really are the way it claims they are, and false if 
they are not. A subjectively valid JOP is true if the sequence of perceptions 
really are the way it claims they are, and false if they are not.55  
 
3.2 The next objection I will consider points out that all the JOPs I have 
discussed already involve the application of objective concepts and indeed, 
 
53 This identification can also be found in Allison 2015, 366-7 and Vanzo 2012, 120. 
54 Vanzo argues that JOPs are not “truth-apt” for Kant on the basis of his claim in the 
Doctrine of Method that truth “rests upon agreement with the object” (A820/B848). 
Since he agrees that JOPs are not about objects, Vanzo concludes that they cannot be 
true (2012, 120). What this overlooks, however, is that Kant makes this claim as part 
of his discussion of the type of holding-for-true [fürwahrhalten] he calls “persuasion”: 
an attitude by which the subject takes something to be true of the objects of her 
perception, albeit on insufficient grounds (See also 9:73 and Chignell 2007). On my 
view, Kant is describing the truth-conditions of JOEs here, not denying that JOPs can 
be true. 
55 Thus, I agree with Prauss that JOPs can be true; however, I disagree with his claim 
that they cannot possibly be false (1971, 238-43). 
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the categories, since the representations they refer to are already determined 
to be representations of extensive magnitudes (such as weight), intensive 
magnitudes (such as warmth or the smell of coffee), substances (such as the sun 
or bodies) and events (such as the sun shining on a stone or a rooster crowing). 
How can I maintain, then, that these judgments are not about objects and 
remain merely subjectively valid?56 
 We can begin to respond to the objection by pointing out that Kant does 
not need his examples to consist in perceptions that have not been subsumed 
under any categories whatsoever. Rather, it is sufficient for the purposes of his 
argument to focus in on an element in a sequence of otherwise conceptually—
and indeed, categorially—determined representations, where that element 
has itself not been (fully) determined by the categories. If he can demonstrate 
that it is only when the element in question is determined by a category that it 
secures ‘relation to the object,’ then his example will be adequate to its 
function. In (1), for example, the subject’s representation of the sun shining on 
the stone is presumably already determined as a representation of an event, 
and the representation of the stone’s warmth is determined as a representation 
of an intensive magnitude. What remains undetermined, however, is the 
relation between these two representations. Before that relation is subsumed 
under the categories, as we have seen, all the subject can report is that former 
representation is succeeded by the latter—that is, she can only report the 
temporal succession of these representations that obtains as a result of her 
reproductive imagination. Once she actively subsumes this relation under the 
category of cause-and-effect, however, she can now claim that the event of the 
sun shining is objectively connected to the stone’s warmth as cause to effect. 
Kant’s example shows how the addition of a category converts the awareness 
of a merely temporal relation between two individual (but otherwise 
conceptually determined) representations into a judgment about an actual 
connection between the objects those representations are of. This is sufficient 
for his purposes, since it serves as an instance that illustrates the general role 
the categories are meant to play in relating representations to objects and thus, 
in building up a subject’s complex objective representation of the world. 
 A complete response to the objection under consideration, however, 
will require a further clarification. Kant indicates in the Critique that in order 
for a temporal sequence of perceptions to even be consciously apprehended 
 
56 See Prauss 1971, 188; Beck 1978, 51-2; Pollok 2008, 338-9. 
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and represented as a temporal sequence, it must already at least be determined 
by the categories of quantity, since these are required to represent time itself as 
a unified extensive magnitude (B161). As such, it is not quite accurate to say 
even that the relation between perceptions reported by a JOP is entirely 
categorially undetermined. Rather, the relation remains undetermined in 
particular by what Kant calls the relational categories—substance-inherence, 
cause-effect, and community—the application of which, as we have seen, is 
required in order to convert a subject’s awareness of a mere temporal sequence 
in her representations into a judgment that those representations are correctly 
combined, or, equivalently, that the objects they represent are actually 
connected.57   
In the System of Principles, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of 
combination. The first, which he calls “composition” [Zusammensetzung or 
compositio], consists in a synthesis that is governed merely by the mathematical 
categories of “what does not necessarily belong to each other.” The second, 
which he calls “connection” [Verknüpfung or nexus], is the “synthesis of that 
which is manifold insofar as they necessarily belong to one another, as e.g., an 
accident belongs to some substance, or the effect to the cause” (B201n*)—in 
other words, a combination in accordance with one of the relational categories. 
On the interpretation I have defended here, JOPs report merely that one 
representation follows another in time, without determining whether these 
representations are correctly combined. Borrowing Kant’s language from the 
Analytic, then, the sequence of representations reported by such a judgment 
is a mere “composition” of two representations that are not claimed to “belong 
to each other”. In contrast, JOEs express what Kant calls a “connection” 
between perceptions:  by subsuming the relation between the representations 
under the relational categories, such judgments involve the claim that the 
representations “belong to one another”—that is, that they are correctly 
 
57 This is in line with Kant’s claim at A664/B692 that while the mathematical 
categories of quantity and quality are constitutive of intuition, the dynamical 
categories of relation and modality are constitutive of experience. The dynamical 
categories also include the categories of modality. I focus on the relational categories 
in my discussion since, as Kant notes, the dynamical categories do not add any 
content to what is thought about the object. Rather, they merely express whether the 
object is possible, actual or necessary in light of the necessary conditions of experience 
that are due to the understanding, judgment and reason. Thus, the role of the 
categories of modality, Kant says, is to “restric[t]” the other categories “to merely 
empirical use” (A219/B266). 
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combined because they correspond to a connection in the objects 
represented.58  
It follows, then, that it is specifically the addition of a relational category 
that allows for a JOP to be ‘converted’ into a JOE.59 This is certainly the case 
with Kant’s own examples, which, as we have seen, involve adding the 
category of substance-inherence or the category of cause-and-effect. It also 
maps nicely onto his discussion in the Analogies of Experience, which 
specifically treat the relational categories. The general principle of the 
Analogies, Kant says, is that “Experience is possible only through the 
representation of a necessary connection of perceptions” (A176/B218, my 
emphasis). Subsuming perceptions that are merely “juxtaposed” 
(zusammengestellt) in time under relational categories involves claiming that 
these perceptions are “necessarily”—that is, objectively—combined 
(A176/B219). This is how, on Kant’s view, perception gives rise to experience. 
And correspondingly, it is the addition of a relational category that allows the 
conversion of a judgment of perception into a judgment of experience. 
I should clarify here that I am not claiming that a JOP cannot employ 
any relational categories at all.60 Rather, as I have already discussed, it is 
sufficient that some relation between the objects represented remains 
undetermined by a relational category. Thus, although in Kant’s example, the 
representation of the sun shining is presumably already thought to be a 
representation of an event and, as such, has already been subsumed under the 
 
58 The contrast is not referred to using these terms in the Prolegomena: there, Kant says 
that both JOEs and JOPs express “connections” (e.g., at 4:300). However, he 
repeatedly differentiates two kinds of connection in the Prolegomena: on the one hand, 
a “necessary” or “synthetic connection” (4:305) of perceptions that accords with “the 
rules that determine the connection of representations in the concept of an 
object”(4:290), and, on the other hand, a “logical connection” (4:298, 4:304) or “mere 
aggregate” of perceptions (4:310) that merely reflects how they are “given in sensory 
intuition” (4:304). It is the latter, on my view, that comes to be called a mere 
“composition” in the note added to the B-edition that I cite above. Kant also claims 
that it is the “composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition” that enables 
consciousness of mere perceptions at B160 (my emphasis). However, he is not always 
consistent in his usage, sometimes continuing to refer to combinations due merely to 
the imagination as “connections” (e.g., at B164; B233). Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for pressing me on this. 
59 This has already been noted by a number of other interpreters. See Prauss 1971, 163-
4; Beck 1978, 52; Sassen 2008, 277; Pollok 2008, 337-8; Friedman 2012, 258; Allison 
2015, 300-3; Beizaei 2017, 348, 351-61. 
60 Compare Sassen 2008, 278; Beizaei 2017, 360. 
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category of cause, it is its connection with the representation of the stone’s 
warmth that has not been determined by a relational category.61 
 
3.3 Another objection that denies that judgments that are about sequences in a 
subject’s perceptions are merely subjectively valid does so on the grounds of 
Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy. There, as I have already discussed, 
Kant argues that the application of the category of cause-and-effect is 
necessary for representing an objective sequence of events. The objection 
claims that this point should apply to any sequence of events, including 
sequences in one’s representations. This would then entail that applying the 
category of cause-and-effect is a necessary condition even on representing a 
sequence in one’s perceptions, and it should follow from this that judgments 
about such sequences are already determined by a relational category and 
thus, objectively valid. 
 What this objection overlooks, however, is that Kant’s concern in the 
Second Analogy is precisely to distinguish a subjective sequence in one’s 
representations from an objective sequence in events, and to argue that 
application of the category of cause-and-effect is a necessary condition only 
on representing the latter. Indeed, Kant argues that we must apply the 
category of cause-and-effect in order to judge whether or not a subjective 
sequence of representations corresponds to an objective sequence of events. 
As for the subjective sequence, Kant says: 
 
I am therefore only conscious that my imagination places one state 
before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in 
 
61 This is important for my response to a possible objection. I have argued that 
judgments like (3) When I hear a rooster crow, I imagine the smell of coffee, and (4) 
When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight, are JOPs. However, the subject of 
these judgments is the ‘I’ which, as such, is presumably thought of as a substance 
(though this will need to be qualified: see n. 64 below). Moreover, if this is the 
standard format of all JOPs, then all JOPs already employ the relational category of 
substance. On my view, however, this is compatible with their status as JOPs, since I 
do not claim that JOPs cannot employ any relational categories at all. Rather, as I 
explain above, their status as JOPs derives from the fact that they report a merely 
temporal relation between perceptions, where that relation in particular has not been 
subsumed under a relational category, and as such, is not taken to correspond to a 
connection between the objects the perceptions are of. It is only by judging that the 
objects the perceptions are of are connected as substance to accident, cause to effect, 
or as mutually interacting members of a community that a JOP is converted to a JOE. 
See n. 64 below for further discussion. I thank Colin McLear as well as an anonymous 
referee for raising this worry. 
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the object; or, in other words, through the mere perception the 
objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding one another 
remains undetermined (B233-4). 
 
In order to judge whether the subjective sequence of perceptions I have due to 
my reproductive imagination corresponds to an objective sequence of events, 
Kant continues: 
 
the relation between the two states must be thought in such a way that 
it is thereby necessarily determined which of them must be placed 
before and which after rather than vice versa. The concept, however, 
that carries a necessity…with it can only be a pure concept of 
understanding, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here 
the concept of the relation of cause and effect… (B234) 
 
In other words, Kant does not argue in the Second Analogy that application of 
the category of cause-and-effect is a necessary condition on representing even 
a subjective sequence in one’s representations. Rather, and in line with my 
discussion so far, his point is that applying the category is necessary in order 
to make a judgment that refers such a sequence of representations to objects—
that is, that claims of the events the representations are of that one actually 
succeeds the other in time. 
 
3.4 The last objection I will consider claims that, on Kant’s view, a subject’s 
consciousness of her own perceptions in time amounts to inner experience. 
Given this, judgments that express temporal sequences of perceptions—which 
I have here identified as JOPs—should actually be thought of as judgments of 
(inner) experience. As such, they cannot be merely subjectively valid and, like 
all JOEs, require application of relational categories (in particular, the category 
of cause). 
 My response to this objection is to deny that consciousness of the 
temporal sequence of one’s perceptions alone amounts to inner experience. As 
we saw in §3.3, Kant indicates in the Second Analogy that a subject can be 
aware of the order in which her imagination calls up perceptions without yet 
subsuming them under the category of cause (B233-4). It is this immediate 
awareness of the subjective temporal order of her perceptions that I take JOPs 
to express. In order for this awareness to amount to any kind of experience of 
an objective order of events, application of the category of cause is necessary. 
The subject has outer experience, as we have seen, when she takes her sequence 
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of perceptions to correspond to a causally determined sequence of outer events. 
She has inner experience, on my view, when she takes the sequence of her 
representations to itself be causally determined, that is, when she applies the 
category of cause to her own representations.62 In doing so, she takes the 
temporal order of her representations to be determined by (psychological) 
causal laws and goes beyond the immediate awareness of that order which, I 
have argued, is expressed by a JOP.63  
Kant explicitly distinguishes between the mere awareness of one’s 
perceptions and inner experience along these very lines in the Anthropology. 
“Perception,” he says, “could be called merely appearance of inner sense. 
However, in order for it to become inner experience the law must be known 
which determines the form of this connection…” (7:144n28, my emphases)  
“[I]t is…necessary,” he repeats, “to begin with observed appearances in oneself, 
and then to progress above all to the assertion of certain propositions that 
concern human nature; that is, to inner experience.” (7:143, my emphases) In 
these passages, Kant clearly distinguishes between mere awareness of 
perceptions on the one hand, and inner experience on the other. The latter, he 
says, involves asserting “certain propositions that concern human nature.” 
Though a full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper, I take the 
“propositions” concerning human nature that Kant has in mind here to be the 
natural, psychological laws that humans are subject to. These laws—which 
Kant identifies as laws of association (A100; 7:176)—govern the reproduction 
of representations through the imagination. Kant’s point in these passages, as 
I see it, then, is that inner experience requires taking one’s representations to 
be causally determined by laws that govern human psychology. 
Most importantly for my purposes in this paper, Kant makes clear that 
a subject can have mere awareness of her perceptions in time, where this 
awareness does not yet amount to causally determined inner experience. 
 
62 Indeed, though I cannot defend this claim in this paper, this is another way in which 
JOPs turn out to be crucial for Kant’s account of experience, namely, in virtue of 
expressing the kind of empirical apperception that forms the basis for inner 
experience and knowledge of ones’ own psychology. I develop an account of this 
elsewhere.  
63 Judgments that subsume representations themselves under the category of cause 
count as JOEs in a derivative sense. They do not—as per my definition in §2—claim 
that what is represented by a sequence of perceptions is combined in the independent 
object the perceptions are of. Rather, they treat the perceptions themselves as inner 
objects, in virtue of claiming that their succession in time is causally determined. 
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Judgments that merely express the former awareness are not JOEs, on my 
view, and do not presuppose that my representations have been subsumed 
under the category of cause.64 Rather, as I have argued, they are merely 
subjectively valid JOPs. 
 
4 In this final section, I argue that a key advantage of my reading of the 
distinction between objective and merely subjective validity is that it can 
explain why this distinction appears so centrally in Kant’s deduction of the 
categories, both in the Prolegomena and in the B-edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. In contrast, as I will explain, the reading I criticized in §1 obscures 
Kant’s argumentative strategy in the Deduction. 
In the Prolegomena, Kant claims that he takes his arguments to provide 
a “complete solution of the Humean problem.” (4:313) The “Humean 
problem,” as Kant understands it, is a version of the “skeptical doubts” 
concerning the idea of a necessary connection that Hume presents in the 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, generalized so as to apply to other 
concepts and principles that Kant believes are not derived from experience.65 
Now, there are a number of difficult questions concerning Kant’s reading of 
Hume, as well as the various dimensions along which he might be thought to 
have offered a response to him.66 For the purposes of this paper, I hope to 
 
64 We might question why the subject needs to bring her representations under the 
category of cause in particular in order to count as making an (inner) JOE. Why is it 
not sufficient that she think of herself as the subject of her perceptions—as she does in 
the judgments I have identified as JOPs—and so, as a substance? In response, it should 
be noted that Kant makes clear in the Paralogisms that in thinking of oneself merely 
as the subject of one’s thoughts, one does not in fact use the schematized category of 
substance, and so, succeed in thinking of oneself as a substantial object (A348-51; 
B410-1, see also Kraus 2019). Merely thinking of oneself as the subject of one’s 
thoughts does not amount to intuiting oneself as persisting in time; the latter is 
required, however, for application of the schematized category of substance. On my 
view, it is only by thinking of the sequence of one’s representations in time as causally 
determined that one succeeds in cognizing oneself as an (inner) object. I develop this 
claim elsewhere. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point. 
65 Hume, Enquiry, §4. Some of the concepts that Kant extends the “Humean problem” 
to—such as the concept of substance—were considered by Hume himself in the 
Treatise of Human Nature, which predates the Enquiry by ten years. However, while a 
German translation of the Enquiry was published in 1755 and was owned by Kant, 
the Treatise was not fully translated into German until the 1790s, after the publication 
of the Prolegomena and both editions of the Critique. On this point, see Kuehn 1983, 
179, and for an extended discussion, Guyer 2008, Introduction and Chs. 1 and 2. 
66 Stephen Engstrom argues that the Deduction “does not aim at a refutation of 
skepticism” (Engstrom 1994, 359), either of the Cartesian or the Humean variety. 
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sidestep most of these questions. First, I will only be concerned with how Kant 
himself understands the so-called “Humean problem,” setting aside the 
question of whether he is right to read Hume as he does.67 Second, I will only 
focus on one aspect of the problem: the question of how we can be rationally 
entitled to apply concepts that have not been derived from experience to the 
objects of experience. Since Kant himself describes the main goal of the 
Transcendental Deduction as consisting in answering how we are entitled to 
apply the a priori categories to the objects of experience (A85/B117), I take it to 
be relatively uncontroversial to assume that he aims to respond to this 
question. Third, we should note that Kant takes the relational categories to be 
especially central to the “Humean problem.” As he argues in §27 of the 
Prolegomena, Hume’s doubts about the concept of necessary connection are 
automatically applicable not only to the concept of a causal connection but also 
to concepts of the kinds of connection covered by the other two relational 
categories: namely, a connection between a substance and its accidents, as well 
as between mutually dependent objects in a community (4:310). For the 
purposes of this paper, then, I will focus in on a ‘Humean skeptic’ who denies 
in particular that we are rationally entitled to apply the relational categories 
to the objects of experience, and consider that component of Kant’s argument 
in the Deduction that could be said to respond to such a skeptic by invoking 
the distinction between objective and merely subjective validity. 
We can express Kant’s argumentative strategy against such a skeptic in 
the terms of the Prolegomena as follows: we are rationally entitled to apply the 
relational categories because they are necessary conditions on making JOEs. 
In other words, the application of a relational category is necessary in order to 
transform a JOP into a JOE, and so, if we were unable to apply the relational 
 
Considering Humean skepticism in particular, however, Engstrom’s main point is 
that Kant does not seek to refute Hume’s skepticism, but rather to “remove” its source 
by showing that the categories do not have an empirical origin (375). As Engstrom 
notes, Kant’s full response to Hume involves answering the “question of our right to 
employ” the categories (376). It is the latter that I will be concerned with here, and I 
take my construal of it to be compatible with Engstrom’s characterization of Kant’s 
task. See also Ameriks 2000, 43; Ameriks 2003, esp. 51, 65-6; Hatfield 2001, Watkins 
2004, 381-90 and Dyck 2011, esp. 495-6 for other versions of the claim that Kant does 
not seek to refute Hume. For responses to the concerns of many of these interpreters 
that I am in broad agreement with see Guyer 2008, esp. Introduction, Chs. 1-2. 
67 Kant clearly does read Hume as denying that we are rationally entitled to apply the 
category of cause to the objects of experience and sees himself as responding to this 
kind of skepticism. For a particularly vivid statement of this, see CPrR, 5:51-3.  
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categories, we would be limited to making mere JOPs.68 But if the relational 
categories are necessary conditions on making JOEs, the Humean skeptic 
cannot deny that we are entitled to use them in such judgments.  
Now, a full defense of Kant’s transcendental argument is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Instead, I want to focus in on the following question: why 
should Kant think his argument has any force against the Humean skeptic? 
That is, does Kant have reason to think that such a skeptic will grant that it 
must be possible to make JOEs, such that his argument, if sound, could move 
the skeptic to accept the legitimacy of the relational categories? If we 
understand the distinction between JOPs and JOEs in accordance with the 
standard reading that I criticized in §1, it is hard to see why this should be the 
case. For recall that, on that reading, a JOP is a judgment about the objects of 
perception that cannot be said to hold for all subjects because it is insufficiently 
justified; a JOE, in contrast, is a judgment that has undergone the systematic 
investigation necessary to justify the claim that it holds for all subjects. 
Plugging this reading of the distinction into Kant’s transcendental argument, 
it amounts to the claim that the relational categories are necessary conditions 
on making sufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects: if we could 
not apply these categories, on this reading, we would be limited to making 
insufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects. Even if this were true, 
however, why should it move the Humean skeptic to accept the legitimacy of 
the relational categories? For he is by no means committed to the possibility 
of our making sufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects: indeed, 
since he denies that we are entitled to apply relational categories like 
substance or cause, he has already concluded that any judgments that employ 
such concepts are insufficiently justified.69  
 On my interpretation, in contrast, any judgment that so much as makes 
a claim about the objects of perception claims objective validity, and is, 
 
68 See 4:311. 
69 For the Humean skeptic, this is not (merely) because of a lack of empirical evidence, 
but rather, because such judgments employ concepts that have not been derived from 
experience. Nevertheless, the point stands that Kant cannot hope to get very far with 
the Humean skeptic if his transcendental argument requires the skeptic to grant that 
we can make sufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects. Indeed, some 
interpreters end up concluding that Kant could not even have intended for this 
stretch of argument to have any force against Humean skepticism. See, for example, 
Wolff 2012, 131; Allison 2015, 293. This conclusion, however, is at odds with Kant’s 
claim in the Prolegomena that through his arguments there, he has “thoroughly 
dispose[d] of the Humean doubt.” (4:310) 
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therefore, a JOE; JOPs, in contrast, are judgments about the subject’s 
perceptions rather than about the objects of perception. This allows us to 
translate Kant’s argument as follows: the application of the relational 
categories is a necessary condition on making judgments that so much as make 
a claim about objects; not applying these categories, then, is tantamount to 
being limited to making judgments about one’s own perceptions rather than 
about the objects of perception. On this translation of it, I think we can see why 
Kant could expect his transcendental argument to have force against the 
Humean skeptic. For, if sound, his argument establishes that if we could not 
apply the relational categories, then we could not so much as represent the 
objects of our perception as being a certain way, whether justifiably or not. 
And Kant could quite plausibly claim that the Humean skeptic he is 
responding to does not intend his skepticism to go so far as to deny that we 
are capable of so much as representing the objects of our perception as being 
a certain way.70 The “Humean doubt” that Kant takes himself to be responding 
to has to do in particular with whether we are entitled to apply concepts not 
derived from experience to the objects of experience. It does not call into 
question whether we are entitled to apply concepts that are derived from 
experience to the objects of experience, nor, importantly, whether we can so 
much as take our experience to represent objects in the first place.71 Kant’s 
claim against this skeptic is that his discussion of the distinction between JOPs 
and JOEs has shown that even this minimal achievement—relation to the 
object—requires the application of the a priori relational categories. In a 
nutshell, since the categories are a necessary condition of making JOEs that so 
much as represent objects, Kant concludes, the Humean skeptic cannot deny 
our entitlement to use them in such judgments.72 
 
70 Of course, a more radical skeptic might deny this, but I do not think that Kant’s 
argument is meant to respond to this kind of skeptic. See Guyer 2008, 112-3. 
71 Hume himself arguably describes us as representing objects as actually being some 
way or other. “When we look about us towards external objects,” he says in the 
Enquiry, for example, we “find…that the one [event] does actually, in fact, follow the 
other.” When we find that one event “actually, in fact” follows another, we make a 
claim about objects, rather than about our own perceptions.  
72 Thus, Kant argues in the Prolegomena that the solution to the “Humean problem” 
lies in seeing that the relational categories are not derived from experience, but rather 
that “experience is derived from them,” which he says is a “completely reversed type 
of connection that never occurred to Hume” (4:313). Now, Kant makes clear that by 
“experience” here, he means “a synthetic unification of perceptions” (4:312) and one 
might question why we should think he takes the latter to involve any claim to 
Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity 
 
 34 
 The same transcendental argument recurs centrally in §19 of the B-
Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason. Though Kant does not there put the 
argument in terms of the distinction between JOPs and JOEs, as we have seen, 
he does argue that the addition of a category is necessary to convert a merely 
subjectively valid report about one’s representations into an objectively valid 
judgment about the objects represented. Only by relating our representations 
“in accordance with principles of the objective determination of all 
representations insofar as cognition can come from them” (i.e., the categories), 
Kant argues, “does there arise”: 
 
a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently 
distinguished from the relation of these same representations in 
which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with 
laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say 
‘When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight,’ but not ‘It, the body, 
is heavy,’ which would be to say that these two representations are 
combined in the object, i.e., regardless of any difference in the 
condition of the subject, and are not merely found together in 
perception... (B142) 
  
In this section, too, I believe, Kant’s primary target is the kind of Humean 
skeptic I described above. Kant’s argument against the Humean skeptic, again, 
is that if we were not able to apply the relational categories, we would only 
ever be able to describe the “condition of the subject”—that is, the combination 
of representations the subject finds herself with—rather than so much as 
represent (justifiably or unjustifiably) how things are “combined in the 
object”.  
In sum, I believe that it is only when the distinction between JOPs and 
JOEs is understood as I do here that we can correctly understand Kant’s 
argument against the Humean skeptic. When interpreters read Kant as 
claiming in §§18-9 of the B-deduction that imaginative associations are 
 
objective validity—that is, to representing what the perceptions are of as an object. 
However, this is precisely how Kant understands synthetic unity: as he says in the 
Deduction, it is their synthetic unity that “constitutes the relation of representations 
to an object, thus their objective validity, and consequently is that which makes them 
into cognitions…” (B137-8, see also B218). I thank an anonymous referee for pressing 
me to further clarify this point.  
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insufficient grounds for judgments about objects, they mistake what is meant to 
be a response to such a skeptic for a statement of agreement with him.73  
Now, of course, Kant does agree with Hume on some crucial points. He 
agrees, for example, that the concept of cause is not derived from our 
experience of events. And he agrees that our reproductive imagination is 
governed by laws of association that make it the case that we habitually 
connect representations that frequently go together. His point against the 
Humean skeptic, however, is that with these resources alone, our mental lives 
would be far more impoverished than he anticipates. For even simply to take 
our imaginative associations as grounds for judging that objects are a certain 
way requires that our judgments have the categorial form that is necessary in 
order for them to be about objects. Since our mental lives are not so 
impoverished, Kant argues, we are committed to the possibility of doing just 
that.74 
  
 
73 See, for example, Allison 2004, 180; Longuenesse 1998, 187; Wolff 2012, 131; Pollok 
2008, 327. 
74 For very helpful comments, discussion or advice, I am grateful to Richard Booth, 
Sarah Buss, Hannah Ginsborg, Colin McLear, Tyke Nunez, Laura Ruetsche, Tad 
Schmaltz, Umrao Sethi, Daniel Warren, Jessica Williams, participants at the 2019 
Eastern Study Group of the North American Kant Society, the 2019 Kant Congress, 
the Faculty Working Group at the University of Michigan department of philosophy, 
audience members at the University of South Florida, as well as an anonymous 
referee for this journal. 
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